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Dieterich: Forum Non Conveniens and the Warsaw Convention: Leaving the Turbu

NOTE
FORUM NON CONVENIENS AND THE WARSAW
CONVENTION: LEAVING THE TURBULENCE
BEHIND?
The most difficult category of questions of all those to which human
flight has given rise is the complex of problems relating to judicial
competence and the law to be applied in the air.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The discretionary use of the doctrine of forum non conveniens to
dismiss cases which are properly before courts has been justified and
advocated as an effective means of relieving "calendar congestion" in
this country since 1929.2 In that same year, a multilateral treaty
governing the international carriage of passengers, baggage and cargo
was drafted which gave to passengers with claims arising under the
treaty the choice of four forums in which actions must be brought.3 The
United States adhered to the treaty, known as the Warsaw Convention,
in 1934. 4
The use of the doctrine of forum non conveniens ("FNC") to
dismiss cases brought before U.S. courts by foreign plaintiffs was
eventually sanctioned and expanded by the Supreme Court in Piper

1. J. M. SPAIGHT, AIRCRAFT IN PEACE AND THE LAW 106 (1919).
Men have legislated for travellers by land and sea; travellers by air are unknown to the
law. Justinian, as M. Piogey has observed, never foresaw that Icarus would disturb so
inconsiderately the Code, the Digest, the Institutes, and even the "Novels."
Id.
2. Paxton Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 1 (1929).
3. See Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 3020, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49 U.S.C.
§ 40105 (1994) [hereinafter Warsaw Convention or Warsaw].
4. Id. at 3013.
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Aircraft Co. v. Reyno in 1981.5 Since then, U.S. courts have increasingly
applied the doctrine to dismiss cases, including cases properly brought
under the Warsaw Convention. 6 In 1987, the Fifth Circuit addressed the
question of whether or not a federal court can apply the doctrine of FNC
in a case governed by Warsaw. 7 Noting that "American courts could
become the forums for litigation that has little or no relationship with
this country[,]" 8 the court concluded: "We simply do not believe that the
United States through adherence to the Convention has meant to forfeit
such a valuable procedural tool as the doctrine of forum non
conveniens."9 Subsequently, no federal appellate court refused to apply
the doctrine until 2002 when, in Hosaka v. United Airlines, Inc., the
Ninth Circuit found it to be in conflict with the precedent law of
Warsaw.' 0
In reaching its decision, Hosaka adopted an "internationally
oriented"" approach to treaty interpretation conducive to achieving
harmonization desired by adhering states. "[I]t is reasonable to impute to
the parties an intent that their respective courts strive to interpret the
treaty consistently,"' 2 for to do otherwise undermines "the whole object
of the treaty."' 3 To allow courts to apply a "national [procedural] law"' 4
5. 454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981) (defining forum non conveniens as a doctrine by which a trial
court may exercise its discretion to dismiss a case where an "alternative forum has jurisdiction to
hear the case and when trial in the chosen forum" would unduly burden the defendant or the court is
an otherwise inappropriate forum due to its own legal and administrative concerns).
6. See discussions infra. See also Martin Davies, Time to Change the Federal Forum Non
Conveniens Analysis, 77 TuL. L. REV. 309, 386 n.335 (2002) (noting that Federal district courts
heard seven requests for FNC dismissals in 1947, all for dismissal to U.S. forums, whereas in 2001,
ninety-seven requests were heard, all for foreign forums); Allan I. Mendelsohn, Recent
Developments in the Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine, FED. LAW., Feb. 2005, at 45 (noting ten
cases issued by federal courts of appeal affirming the existence of the doctrine).
7. Trivelloni-Lorenzi v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. (In re Air Crash Disaster Near New
Orleans, Louisiana on July 9, 1982), 821 F.2d 1147, 1153 (5th Cir. 1987), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Lopez, 490 U.S. 1032 (1989). The court noted that
its research did not disclose any other case where the issue was addressed or decided, although some
courts did apply the doctrine. Indeed, it found only one case in which the issue was even raised, and
in that case the Second Circuit left it unresolved. Id at 1160 n. 16 (citing Irish Nat'l Ins. Co. Ltd., v.
Aer Lingns Teoranta, 739 F.2d 90,91 (2d Cir. 1984)).
8. Trivelloni-Lorenzi,821 F.2d at 1162.
9. Id. (emphasis added).
10. 305 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2002).
11. Sandeep Gopalan, The Creation ofInternationalCommercialLaw: Sovereignty Felled?, 5
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 267, 296 (2004). Within this Note, "States" denotes international entities,
whereas the term without capitalization refers to the constituents of the United States of America.
12. Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 660 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
13. Antonin Scalia, Keynote Address: Foreign Legal Authority in the FederalCourts, 98 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L. L. PROC. 305, 305 (2004).
14. See Gopalan, supra note 11, at 297.
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to dismiss international cases from domestic dockets, risks harming
litigants and international law' 5 if such use is contrary to signatory
expectations. When the conceptual analysis under that national law
centers, as it does with FNC today, on relatively subjective and casespecific assessments of what constitutes "inconvenience," 16 the risk of
erosion of international understandings by rising "j]urisdictional
provincialism"' 7 is especially grave.
The question of whether or not FNC is applicable under the 1999
Montreal Convention, which entered into force as of November 5, 2003
and replaces Warsaw,18 has yet to be answered by courts. Because
Montreal includes provisions similar to those giving rise to the Warsaw
FNC controversy, plaintiffs bringing suit under Montreal can be
expected to argue, in opposition to FNC motions to dismiss brought by
defendants, that FNC is inapplicable. Critical to formulating arguments
for and against FNC applicability under Montreal is an understanding of
the evolution of the Warsaw FNC conflict.
This Note will attempt to inform such an understanding by first, in
Part II, reviewing the role of courts in implementing international
agreements. The development of the doctrine of FNC will be discussed
in Part III. The history of the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal
modernization will be reviewed in Part IV, including the split of
authority on the use of FNC under Warsaw. Part V will demonstrate that
both the approach to treaty interpretation used by the Hosaka court and
the decision it reached were reasonable and conducive to harmonization.
The Note will conclude with observations about the anticipated
controversy under Montreal.
II.

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

When federal courts interpret a treaty to which the United States is a
party, they should give considerable respect to the interpretation of the
same treaty by the courts of other signatories. Otherwise the whole
15.

Patrick M. McFadden, Provincialism in United States Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 4, 56

(1995).
16.

Alan Reed, Multi-Party Group Actions and Availability of Legal Aid, 151 NEW L.J. 177,

(2001) (noting that the Anglo-American trend has been to move from a restrictive test of vexation,
harassment or oppression to a much broader discretionary test of inconvenience).
17.

McFadden, supra note 15, at 56.

18. Mendelsohn, supra note 6, at 46. The U.S. was the 3 0 th Contracting State of the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to ratify the Montreal Convention and did so on
September 5, 2003. Montreal Convention of 1999 on Compensation for Accident Victims Set to
Enter Into Force, available at http://www.icao.int/icao/en/nr/2003/pio200314.htm (last visited July

23, 2005).
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object of the treaty, which is to establish a single, agreed-upon
19 regime
governing the actions of all the signatories, will be frustrated.
A.

Treaties as Law

Pacta sunt servanda, the "fundamental principle of the law of

treaties,,

20

is the notion that "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the

parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.,

21

Indeed a

state otherwise bound to a treaty may not invoke a violation of its own
internal law as invalidating its consent unless it "concern[s] a rule of its
internal law of fundamental importance. 2 2 Furthermore, a treaty has a

preemptive effect on a state's national law within its "substantive
scope.,

23

Treaty law may be transformed into local law by legislative

act, and such legislative transformation is required in many countries. In
the United States, however,
implementing legislation.2 4

treaties

may

take

effect

without

The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution gave treaties the
status of law and instructed courts to give them effect.25 "[T]he Framers
were concerned about treaty violations in part because such violations
could offend other states and perhaps lead to calamity and war."2 6 The
Supreme Court has affirmed that courts must give effect to individual
rights established by self-executing treaties,27 and the United States legal
system is now influenced by several hundred such treaties. 28 The growth
in the number of treaties and concomitant substantive law parallels "the
expansion of cross-border legal interaction" necessitating "broad

19. Scalia, supra note 13, at 305.
20. 1.M. SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 53 (Ist ed. 1973).
21. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 26, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332,
339.
22. Sinclair, supra note 20, at 54.
23. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. V. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 172 (1998) (quoting Brief
for United States as Amicus Curiae at 16, El Al Israel Airlines, 525 U.S. 155 (1998) (No. 97-475),
availableat 1998 WL 401592).
24. Michael P. Van Alstine, Federal Common Law in an Age of Treaties, 89 CORNELL L.
REV. 892, 905 (2004) [hereinafter Federal Common Law].
25. U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see Carlos Manuel Vazquez,
Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies ofIndividuals, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1108 (1992).
26. Vazquez, supra note 25, at 1160. Indeed, Alexander Hamilton argued that the "federal
judiciary ought to have cognizance of all causes in which the citizens of other countries are
concerned." Id.
27. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 667 (1992); Evan Criddle, The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties in U.S. Treaty Interpretation,44 VA. J. INT'L L. 431, 457 (2004);
Federal Common Law, supra note 24, at 906.
28. Federal Common Law, supra note 24, at 917, 921-22.
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international solutions., 29 Not surprisingly, scholarly debate as to the
proper role of treaties in domestic law has also grown, one such debate
centering on the very constitutionality of self-executing treaties.30
Nevertheless, the "depth and breadth of the influence of self-executing
treaties in the modern U.S. legal system" speaks for their force as federal
law. 3
B.

Treaty Interpretation

In applying the law of treaties, courts are active participants in
supporting treaty regimes. 32 Although treaties are similar to legislativelyenacted statutes in their effect as domestic law, treaties, unlike statutes,
create reciprocal international obligations as well.33 Thus, the uniform
interpretation of treaty provisions across national borders becomes
paramount in ensuring the success of treaties requiring judicial
implementation.34 Perhaps because of this difference, and despite the
importance of treaty interpretation, "American jurisprudence is
remarkably conflicted about the proper method" to apply to treaty
construction. 35 For instance, courts may choose either "strict

29. Id.at 894-95
30. Id. at 895.
31. Id. at 921.
32. See generally Laura M. Murray, Domestic Court Implementation of Coordinative
Treaties. FormulatingRules for Determining the Seat of Arbitration Under the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign ArbitralAwards, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 859, 860 (2001).
33. Federal Common Law, supra note 24, at 949-50. Some of the controversy about treaties
relates to separation of powers concerns and deference by courts to the executive branch in matters
of foreign relations.
Born into legal limbo, treaties live a double life: one half as part of the American legal
system, the other as an expression of an international undertaking with other nations.
This strange birth and schizophrenic life of treaties have led to their being considered
something fundamentally other than public law.
David J. Bederman, Deference or Deception: Treaty Rights as Political Questions, 70 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1439, 1488 (1999) (arguing that proper grounds for applying the political question doctrine in
treaty rights cases are fewer than with any other aspect of foreign relations power).
34. See Murray, supra note 32, at 861,
35. Merle H. Weiner, Navigating the Road between Uniformity and Progress. The Need for
Purposive Analysis of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction,
33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 275, 296 (2002). Controversies surrounding the proper method for
interpreting treaties also abounded during the development of the Vienna Convention. Sir Franklin
Berman International Treaties and British Statutes, 26 STATUTE L. REV. 1, 9 (2005). But
international courts and tribunals have been said to not "waste time analysing any theory of
interpretation; they just do it," applying the Vienna Convention's "Golden Rule" of interpreting "in
good faith in accordance with ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose." Id. at 10 (quoting Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, supra note 21, at 340).
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constructionist" or "purposive" techniques, perhaps depending as much
as anything on the substantive result desired.36 Judges who interpret
treaties according to internationally accepted standards may be labeled
"internationalist," while judges who act as "steward[s] of national
sovereignty entrusted with the responsibility to safeguard national legal
norms and political preferences" are considered "nationalists. '37 In sum,
there is said to be no "core set of domestically derived principles that
U.S. courts faithfully employ in interpreting treaties. 38
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the "Vienna39
Convention") was developed "to facilitate transnational legal order.,
Entered into force without U.S. ratification in 1980 and recognized at the
time by the State Department as being the authority on customary treaty
law, the Vienna Convention continues to have international authoritative
status.40 Although the U.S. is not a party, to the extent the Vienna
Convention codifies existent laws it is binding on all states.
Additionally, the rules the Convention actually generated may in fact
now represent customary standards accepted and recognized within the
international community. 41 Such standards would thus be applicable
today to all treaties, whether entered before or after the Convention, and
whether or not the signatories of the treaty being interpreted themselves
entered into the Convention. Further, it has been argued that the State
Department's acceptance of the international authoritative status of the
42
Vienna Convention further legitimizes its judicial use in this country.
The Vienna Convention adopted a policy of interpretation reflecting
the general rule suggested by its drafting Commission-that treaties "be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its
36.

Weiner, supra note 35, at 297. For example, one commentator has argued, "[t]extual,

intentional, or teleological approaches to the interpretation of international agreements can each be
employed to justify either an expansive or restrictive reading of the scope of applicability of an
agreement." Martin A. Rogoff, Interpretationof InternationalAgreements by Domestic Courts and
the Politics of International Treaty Relations: Reflections on Some Recent Decisions of the United
States Supreme Court, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 559, 569 (1996); see also SANDRA L. BUNNLIVINGSTONE, JURICULTURAL PLURALISM VIS-A-VIS TREATY LAW: STATE PRACTICE AND
ATTITUDES 85-86 (2002).
37. Criddle, supra note 27, at 449. "Nationalist" as used here does not have the meaning as
when used by those discussing treaty power in relation to federalism limitations. See Curtis A.
Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism,97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 394 (1998).
38. David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation,41 UCLA L. REV. 953,
956 (1994).
39. Criddle, supranote 27, at 449.
40. Id.at 443.
41. See id.at 443-44,446.
42. Id.at 443.
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object and purpose., 43 The intent of the parties is, therefore, paramount
but the text is presumed to be the expression of that intent. 4 Thus the
"starting point of interpretation" is the text rather than any external
investigation as to intent.45 Travaux preparatoires are "supplementary
means" to be used in confirming the meaning when textual meaning is
"ambiguous or obscure; or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or
unreasonable. ' 46 This "inhospitality to travaux" is considered to be
inconsistent with the attitude of U.3. courts.4 7
The American Law Institute notes in its Restatement of the Law
Third: Foreign Relations Law of the United States, that courts in the
U.S. are "generally more willing than those of other states to look
outside the instrument to determine its meaning." 48 The United States
Supreme Court, as the "primary enforcer[] ' '49 of treaties through its
appellate jurisdiction, "has never relied upon the Vienna Convention as
an authoritative source of law." 50 Instead, the Court interprets treaties by
beginning with the text and the context in which it was written. 51 When
the text is ambiguous, other rules of construction are used. 2 Specifically,
since the Court construes treaties even more liberally than private
agreements, when the text is ambiguous, it looks beyond it into the
history of the treaty, the negotiations, "and the practical construction
adopted by the parties." 53
43. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, at 340.
44. Criddle, supra note 27, at 438.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 439-40. Nevertheless, it has been said that the "looseness" of Articles 31-33 of the
Vienna Convention allows the introduction of non-textual materials for judicial consideration by
"[a]ny competent international lawyer" to establish a term's "special meaning" or to resolve an
ambiguity. John Norton Moore, Treaty Interpretation,the Constitution and the Rule of Law, 42 VA.
J. INT'L L. 163, 178 (2001).
47. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 325 cmt.
e (1987).
48. Id.at § 325 cmt. g.
49. Vazquez, supranote 25, at 1108.
50. Criddle, supra note 27, at 449. During the drafting of the Vienna Convention, the U.S.
took the position that provisions concerning the use of travaux preparatoireswere too restrictive.
The practice of the U.S. before the International Court of Justice since shows that the precepts of
Article 31 are generally followed but with a clear tendency to rely on travaux preparatoiresand the
"intention of the parties" voiced during drafting. Pierre Klein, The Effects of US Predominance on
the Elaborationof Treaty Regimes and on the Evolution of the Law of Treaties, in UNITED STATES
HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 363, 379 (Michael Byers & Georg

Nolte eds., 2003).
51. Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 397 (1985); accord Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490
U.S. 122, 134 (1989); Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 52-54 (1963).
52. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 700 (1988).
53. Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 432 (1943); accord
Volkswagenwerk, 486 U.S. at 700.
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Indeed, the Court accords the interpretations of sister signatories
"considerable weight., 54 For example, in El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v.
Tsui Yuan Tseng,55 although the Court looked at the text, drafting
history, and underlying purpose of the Convention, it still looked to the
courts of other Warsaw States to determine if its understanding
as to the
56
Convention's preemptive effect was one shared by them.
C. The Dangers of Provincialism
The Supreme Court has cautioned that when interpreting treaties, a
"home-centered... analysis,.. . should
not
be
applied,
mechanically ....
A "methodological provincialism" has been said to
result when courts assume "that international law works on the same
principles, and with the same dynamics, as American law.",58 This form
of provincialism might cause U.S. courts to interpret treaties the way
they might interpret domestic statutes or contracts. 9 It has been argued
that the assimilation of a "parol evidence rule" into U.S. treaty
interpretation has resulted in the institutionalization of a multifactor
judicial inquiry contrary to the "holistic textualist approach" of the
Vienna Convention. 60 But the danger of provincialism has more to do
with how a court applies a particular method rather than what that
method is. An "intemationalist-textualist" court may readily identify
"latent" textual ambiguities and proceed to the consideration of other
evidence to better give effect to the understanding of the parties. 6 1 A
"nationalist" court, although conducting a free-wheeling inquiry, may

54. Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 658 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting
Saks, 470 U.S. at 404).
55. 525 U.S. 155 (1999).
56. Id. at 172-77. Although the Court recently rejected analyses of intermediate appellate
courts of sister signatories to the extent the reasoning was inconsistent with its own, in doing so it
noted that substantial factual distinctions existed and that the "respective courts of last resort...
have yet to speak." Olympic, 540 U.S. at 655 n.9.
57. 525 U.S. at 175.
58. McFadden, supra note 15, at 14.
59. Id. (citing United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 662-63 (1992), in which the
Court supported the law of treaty interpretation with domestic citations rather than the Vienna
Convention).
60. Criddle, supra note 27, at 454-55.
61. The limitations of language in communicating the intent of parties to an agreement have
long been recognized. "[A] literal interpretation of a clause may not be made to defeat the main
purpose of the parties as gathered from the entire treaty." SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATIES, THEIR
MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 224 (2d prtg. 2002).
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give much consideration to its own legal norms and less to giving effect
to a continuing consensus.62
The Vienna Convention's reluctance to permit the use of travaux
preparatoiresreflects in part the concern of some states that "wealthy
nations capable of maintaining superior archives" would be favored or
"privilege[d]. 6 3 But when employed to heighten the sensitivity of
domestic interpreters to the international nature of treaties, and to
ambiguities otherwise easily overlooked,64 use of travaux preparatoires
may help guard against provincial perspectives and better promote
uniformity. 65 A simplistic textual reading is more likely to overlook
for the continued
threats to the ongoing cooperation necessary
66
agreement.
international
an
of
effectiveness
It has been argued that the "Achilles heel" of the Vienna
Convention's interpretive formulation is "its misconception of the
appropriate function of principles of interpretation," and that it fails to
recognize that international agreements involve an ongoing process of
"communication and collaboration, perhaps even with a moving
62. MYRES S. McDOUGAL ET AL., THE INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: PRINCIPLES OF CONTENT AND PROCEDURE 262-63 (1994) (noting the
importance of "striving to overcome the difficulties connected with attempts to ascertain the
contemporary shared expectations of agreement among the parties."). "The most economic method
of stabilizing the relevant expectations would be to give effect to the continuing consensus, within
the limits established by overriding contemporary community policy." Id.
63. Criddle, supra note 27, at 441.
64. Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 687, 747-48
(1998).
The text of an international agreement is an outcome of a process of communication that
seldom can be wholly captured in a few words. Appropriate contextuality does not make
a text meaningless or contentless. It merely places the text in its proper place as a
possible beginning of inquiry and part of a range of indicia of the parties' genuine
expectations.
MCDOUGAL, supranote 62, at xlix. As a delegate to the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties,
Mr. McDougal argued that "there are no fixed or natural meanings of words which the parties to an
agreement cannot alter." Id. at 437 (arguing for the U.S. proposal that would "make accessible to
interpreters whatever elements-be they 'ordinary meaning' or 'subsequent practice' or
'preparatory work' or other-which may be of significance in any particular set of
circumstances ... to encourage ... disciplined canvass by interpreters of all elements which may
aid in the identification and clarification of common intent." Id. at 442.).
65. See Alex Glashausser, Difference and Deference in Treaty Interpretation, 50 VILL. L.
REv. 25, 28 (2005); Van Alstine, supra note 64, at 747-48. See generally Michael F. Sturley,
International Uniform Laws in National Courts: The Influence of Domestic Law in Conflicts of
Interpretation, 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 729 (1987) (discussing the role substantive domestic legal
doctrine plays in creating conflicts in the interpretation of international uniform law in national
courts).
66. Murray, supra note 32, at 919. Murray has argued that the authority to engage in this
"transnational analysis" is derivative of other rules on treaty interpretation, specifically that of
interpreting them in ways that further their "object and purpose." Id. at 875.
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consensus." 67 Van Alstine has argued that the need for international
uniformity compels the federal judiciary to work with courts of other
states to develop international common law around international
conventions, for to do otherwise risks "a progressive disintegration of
whatever international uniformity a convention has achieved in the first
place., 68 At the very least, richer interpretative approaches, with a clear
focus on effecting harmonization and uniformity, could help improve
stability, predictability and efficiency in the international order.69
III.

FORUM NON CONVENIENS

The appropriateness of the use of FNC in international cases is not
a settled issue. 70 The right of a court to use FNC at all differs between
common law and civil law countries. 71 In most civil law countries, a
court with jurisdiction must hear the case, reflecting a preference for
certainty and predictability in jurisdictional matters. 2 Many common
law countries, on the other hand, allow courts the flexibility of
dismissing cases to more appropriate forums.73

67. McDOUGAL, supra note 62, at lxii.
68. Van Alstine, supra note 64, at 693-94.
69. Rogoff, supra note 36, at 684-85.
70. See generally Phillip I. Blumberg, Asserting Human Rights Against Multinational
Corporations Under United States Law: Conceptual and ProceduralProblems, 50 AM. J. COMP. L.
493, 503 (2002). "[FNC] is no longer a minor procedural doctrine. It is producing intense public
controversy, involves an increasing body of litigation, and has led to the emergence of a substantial
legal literature." Id.
71. See Martine Stuckelberg, Lis Pendens and Forum Non Conveniens at the Hague
Conference, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 949, 950 (2001) (discussing the debate over FNC at the Hague
Conference on Private International Law, an international convention on jurisdiction and
enforcement of foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters). While the Brussels Convention
rejected the inclusion of FNC, the benefit of certainty outweighing the need for flexibility, two other
Hague conventions, the Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and
Co-Operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children and
the Convention on the International Protection of Adults, of 1996 and 1999 respectively, both
included FNC-like clauses. See id. at 965. The Preliminary Draft of the Hague Conference of
October 30, 1999, included a FNC clause, allowing the suspension of a case only if the court seised
is clearly inappropriate and a court of another signatory State with jurisdiction is clearly more
appropriate. See id at 971. See also K. Lee Boyd, Are Human Rights Political Questions?, 53
RUTGERS L. REV. 277, 279 (2001) (observing that forum non conveniens "rais[es] the bar" for
meeting the jurisdictional requirements of human rights cases).
72. See Stuckelberg, supra note 71, at 949. See also Alexander Reus, JudicialDiscretion:A
Comparative View of the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Germany, 16 LoY. L. A. INT'L & COMP. L. J. 455, 490 (noting that FNC is "viewed
as a 'curse' to most continental European lawyers").
73. See Stuckelberg, supra note 71, at 949. See also Ronald A. Brand, Comparative Forum
Non Conveniens and the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction andJudgments, 37 TEX. INT'L L. J. 467,
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Forum non conveniens is said to have arisen in Scotland in the early
74
in a case involving a French plaintiff, a French defendant, and
cargo lost en route from Scotland to France.75 Its use was contrary to the
general British rule that "a court possessing jurisdiction must exercise it
unless the reasons to the contrary are clear and cogent," and it was said
as late as 1926 that its use was to be reserved for those cases presenting
"such hardship on the party setting up the plea as would amount to
vexatiousness76 or oppression if the court persisted in exercising
jurisdiction.,
In this country, if the doctrine existed prior to 1929, rarely did any
court refer to it as such, a concession made by the first commentator to
advocate its widespread application that same year." In his Columbia
Law Review article, Paxton Blair touted FNC as a weapon to combat
C4
"calendar congestion
in the trial courts" in larger population centers. 78
Courts and commentators in this country and others have, in justifying
the use of FNC, often cited Blair's article as support for the proposition
that the doctrine enjoys a long-standing history of use in this country,79
although his "efforts to identify cases that applied a forum non
conveniens doctrine sub silentio has been criticized., 80 In his article,
Blair proposed a "wider dissemination" of the FNC "doctrine" to check
the problem "engrossing the attention of the Bar in the larger centers of
population in the United States, the relief of calendar congestion in the
trial courts.",8 1 Blair incited "bench and bar" to take action against the
practice of foreign residents suing foreign corporations for actions
arising elsewhere, appealing to the understandable desire of courts to
clear dockets in a justifiable way.82
1900s,

494 (2002) (stating that neither the civil or common law systems provides a "perfect combination of
predictability, efficiency, and equity in all cases").
74. See Blair, supra note 2, at 20. See also Don Mayer & Kyle Sable, Yes! We Have No
Bananas:Forum Non Conveniens and CorporateEvasion, 4 INT'L BUS. L. REV. 130, 139-40 (2004)

(discussing the history of the doctrine and its defensive use by corporations to have suits brought to
U.S. courts by foreign plaintiffs dismissed).
75. See Mayer & Sable supra note 74, at 139-40.
76. See Blair, supra note 2, at 2 (quoting ANDREW DEWAR GIBB, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
JURISDICTION IN ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND 212 (1926)).

77. See id.
at 2.
78. Id.at 1.
79. See, e.g., GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS
292 (3d ed. 1996); Jacob J. Goldberg, Notes and Comments, Jurisdiction-ForumNon Conveniens,
13 B.U. L. REV. 349, 350 (1933).
80. BORN, supra note 79, at 292 n.23.
81. See Blair, supra note 2, at 1.
82. Blair, supra note 2, at 34
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Although the Supreme Court cited to Blair's article in 1932,83 it did
not apply the FNC doctrine by name until 1947 in the landmark case of
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert.84 The Gulf Oil Court embraced the doctrine,
transforming it into a federal procedural rule allowing a court to modify
its own jurisdictional parameters.8 5 In Gulf Oil, Justice Black vigorously
dissented, saying "[n]either the venue statute nor the statute which has
governed jurisdiction since 1789 contains any indication or implication
that a federal district court, once satisfied that jurisdiction and venue
86
requirements have been met, may decline to exercise its jurisdiction.,
Nevertheless, in the companion case decided the same day, Koster v.
Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co.,87 the Court said "jurisdiction will be
declined whenever considerations of convenience, efficiency, and justice
point to the courts of the [s]tate of the domicile
as appropriate tribunals
' 88
for the determination of the particular case.
In Gulf Oil, the Court identified both private and public-interest
factors to be considered by courts under FNC analyses. 89 Among the
private interest factors to be considered by a court are:
[1] relative ease of access to sources of proof; [2] availability of
compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of
obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; [3] possibility of view of
premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and [4] all other
practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and
inexpensive[;]...
[and 5] the enforcibility of a judgment if one is
90
obtained.

Public interest factors to be considered include: (1) administrative
difficulties of court congestion; (2) the burden of jury duty on a
community with no relation to the litigation; (3) the need to hold the trial
in the area of local interest; and, (4) conducting the trial in a forum at
home with governing law, to avoid problems in conflict of laws and
foreign law. 91

83. Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd., 285 U.S. 413, 423 n.6 (1932) (citing
Blair's article for a "collection[] of authorities"); BORN, supra note 79, at 293-94.
84. 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
85. Id. at 506-08.
86. Id. at 513 (Black, J., dissenting).
87. 330 U.S. 518 (1947).
88. Id. at 528 (quoting Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 288 U.S. 123, 131
(1933)).
89. See GulfOil, 330 U.S. at 508.
90. Id.
91. See id.
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After Gulf Oil, Congress superseded the Court's newly adopted
federal common-law procedural rule of FNC as between federal court
forums by enacting a federal domestic change-of-venue statute in
1982.92 Statutory FNC under § 1404 results in transfer from one federal
court to another, 93 which leaves courts free to apply the common-law
FNC doctrine only in those international cases where the alternative
forum that the defendant favors is in another country.94 The Supreme
Court has done little in the years since Gulf Oil to change the doctrine as
applied to cases involving dismissal to another country, except
for
95
modifications made in the 1981 case, PiperAircraft Co. v. Reyno.
In Piper, the Supreme Court allowed the FNC dismissal of a
product liability case essentially because the plaintiffs were foreign. 96
The Court rejected giving weight to the possibility of a change in
substantive law detrimental to the interests of the plaintiff in the
alternative forum unless the remedy is essentially "no remedy at all," in
which case a dismissal might be "in the interests of justice. 97 The Court
rejected the argument that a strong presumption in favor of the choice of
forum of both home and foreign plaintiffs ensures that defendants will
be held to the highest standard of accountability for wrongdoing since
plaintiffs will ordinarily choose the forum with the most favorable law,
without addressing it. Instead, the Court expressed concern that to
preclude FNC dismissals in cases between foreign plaintiffs and
"American manufacturer[s]" would make American courts, "already
extremely attractive to foreign plaintiffs,

. . .

even more attractive...

further congest[ing] already crowded courts. 9 8
While over the years, advocates of the use of FNC have continued
to focus on it as a method of reducing court congestion, by protecting
U.S. courts from foreign plaintiffs, 99 critics have expressed concern

92.

28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1982).

93.

Id. at § 1404(a).

94.
95.

See Davies, supra note 6, at 311.
454 U.S. 235 (1981).

96. See id. at 255.
97. See id. at 254.
98. See id. at 251-52.
99. Jeffrey A. Van Detta, The Irony of Instrumentalism: Using Dworkin 's Principle-Rule
Distinction to Reconceptualize Metaphoricallya Substance-ProcedureDissonance Exemplified by
Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals in InternationalProduct Injury Cases, 87 MARQ. L. REv. 425,

437 (2004). Professor Van Detta states that FNC represents an "instrumentalist" approach to
jurisprudential needs and, as such, it is "insufficient to meet our long-term.. . needs." Id. at 427-28.
Arguing that FNC is "flatly instrumentalist ... justified.., only on... grounds of expediency," he
"reconceptualize[s] the ... relationship between substantive and procedural law." Id. at 428, 438.
He then applies this reconceptualization to develop a FNC rule harmonizing the principles of
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about the soundness of the assumption underlying the use of the doctrine
in international cases.100 At least one commentator has called for the
doctrine to be abolished.
In a time of crowded dockets and proliferating application of forum
law, the existence of forum non conveniens has undoubtedly provided
a welcome discretionary method of ridding courts of at least some
controversies better litigated elsewhere. But it has also lengthened
litigation, cast yet another doubt upon the validity of a plaintiffs
choice of forum, and at times excused sloppy jurisdiction analyses.
The factors and policies to which the doctrine calls the court's
attention are certainly relevant and important, but they are best
considered in the jurisdictional contexts. There is no valid continuing
conveniens, only a repetitive one. The doctrine
role for forum non101
should be abolished.
Nevertheless, the perception of a potential influx of cases by
foreign plaintiffs engaging in forum shopping' 0 2 to avail themselves of
U.S. justice and the absence of treaties allowing for the international
transfer of cases leaves FNC as "a way to filter them.",10 3 But the lack of
uniformity in FNC application brings uncertainty and increased
transaction costs. 10 4 Some countries have even responded to FNC use by
"corrective justice and "enterprise regulation" underlying tort law, specifically the subset of multinational corporations ("MNC") and foreign plaintiffs involved in product-injury cases. Id. at 428.
100. See Davies, supra note 6, at 324.
101. Margaret G. Stewart, Forum Non Conveniens: A Doctrinein Search of a Role, 74 CAL. L.
REv. 1259, 1324 (1986).
102. "In reality, plaintiffs engage in forum shopping and defendants engage in reverse forum
shopping,.., each seeking to turn to their own advantage the laws and procedures in the respective
forums." Linda J. Silberman, Developments in Jurisdiction and Forum Non Conveniens in
International Litigation: Thoughts on Reform and a Proposalfor a Uniform Standard, 28 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 501, 525 (1993).
103. Helen E. Mardirosian, Forum Non Conveniens, 37 LOy. L.A. L. REv. 1643, 1684 (2004).
104. "[T]he forum non conveniens balancing equation has become so intuitive and subjective
that successful prediction is as likely as tattooing soap bubbles." Reed, supra note 16, at 177
(asserting that "the conceptual analysis of forum non conveniens in England, the United States, and
other common law countries such as Australia, has focused upon what constitutes inconvenience in
transnational cases"). Adding to the uncertainty in this country is the yet unanswered question of
whether or not state or federal FNC doctrine should apply in state courts in international cases. In
Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, the court suggested that FNC is a federal procedural law applicable in
federal courts, but not state courts, and its rationale may apply in international cases. 510 U.S. 443,
453 (1994). If FNC is regarded by the Court as a rule of federal procedural law in international
cases as "a substantive federal common law rule of [FNC]," it would likely require the Court's
"attributing substantial weight to federal interest in foreign relations and foreign commerce." BORN,
supra note 79, at 359-60. "State courts traditionally have formed their own FNC laws. Absent
federal statutory law preempting state FNC standards, many states have deviated from the standard
set in PiperAircraft, which tends significantly to disfavor foreign plaintiffs." Ison v. E.1. Dupont De
Nemours & Co., 729 A.2d 832, 840 (Del. 1999) (footnote omitted) (applying state Cryo-Maid
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U.S. courts by passing so-called "blocking statutes" to remove the
jurisdiction of their courts when the case has been first brought to the
courts of another country.' 0 50ne commentator has said that "[t]he issue
of FNC is probably the
thorniest one dividing the Civil and the Common
06
Law legal systems."1

IV.

THE WARSAW CONVENTION

We of this generation were saved, at least, the trouble of learning
whether an aircraft is a "place" within the meaning of the Betting Acts,
whether a pilot can be guilty of an offence corresponding to "barratry
of the master" at sea, and so on. It is an advantage in some ways to be
born before some0 7 great and beneficent invention or discovery has had
time to develop.'
A.

The Agreement

The world has grown smaller in the last hundred years thanks to the
development of an international system of air travel. Since 1934, the
international air transportation of passengers has been governed
primarily by the Warsaw Convention, a multilateral treaty governing
international aviation, adhered to by the United States' 08 and by most
other countries whose airlines have international routes. 0 9 The critical
importance of this treaty to our enjoyment of an ever shrinking world
cannot be overstated.
1. The World's Air Divided
When the international community developed the treaty in the
decade following World War I, significant barriers to international

factors under which the trial court must find "overwhelming hardship" to the defendant for FNC
dismissal).
105. See Dante Figueroa, Are There Ways Out of the Current Forum Non Conveniens Impasse
Between the United States andLatin America?, 1 BUS. L. BRIEF (AM. U.) 42, 45 (2005).
106. Henry Saint Dahl, Forum Non Conveniens, Latin America and Blocking Statutes, 35 U.

MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 21, 45 (2003) (claiming that blocking statutes are not indispensable in
Latin America because problems of illegality, loss of evidence and impracticality prevent
jurisdiction from accruing).
107.

SPAIGHT, supra note 1, at 106-107.

108. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 3.
109. See Causey v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. (In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia on Apr. 22,
1974), 684 F.2d 1301, 1304 (9th Cir. 1982).
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aviation existed." A fundamental obstacle was the first custom of
international air travel, "that States control the atmosphere over their
territories.""' This custom developed during the war and did not allow
for the free passage of air craft over and between nations." 2 Out of this
custom grew the first principle of international law related to air travel:
"Aerial space above territorial land and water included within the
boundaries of a State constitute an integral part of the sovereignty of a
State.""' 3 This principle recognized no freedom of passage." 4 In the
decade following the war, innocent passage was regarded as a privilege
to be enjoyed by nations at the "sufferance of their sister states." 1 5 Since
such a privilege could be granted only "by virtue of treaty provisions to
that effect,"' "16 group action by the international community was quickly
undertaken. 117
The Air Navigation Convention of October 13, 1919, while
announcing the fundamental agreement in principle that "every power
has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air space above its
territory," set down rules of conduct to allow for innocent passage
during times of peace, rules designed to insure the interests of those
states "flown over."'18 Other treaties followed as did domestic
legislation also contemplating and providing for the innocent passage of
none regulated questions of
foreigners in peace time. 19 Nevertheless,
20
law.'
aviation
private international
2. A Brave New World
In 1923, the French Government proposed an international
conference on the codification of private air law, resulting in the First
110. See generally Clement L. Bouve, The Development of International Rules of Conduct in
Air Navigation, I AIR L. REV. 1 (1930).

111. Id.at 1.The article continues:
With the acceptance of the principle of air sovereignty born of the World War, it at once
became apparent that for nations, as a matter of practice, to insist strictly upon the
exercise of the right to exclude foreign aircraft would result in a death-blow to the
progress of interstate air navigation.

Id.at2.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

See id.at 1.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 38.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id.at 2-3.
Id. at4.

120.

See Alexander N. Sack, International Unification of Private Law Rules on Air

Transportationand the Warsaw Convention, 4 AIR L. REv. 345, 346 (1933).
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International Conference on Private Aerial Law in 1925.121 The Warsaw
Convention was ultimately the result of two international conferences,
the one held in Paris in 1925 and one in Warsaw in 1929, and by the
interim Comite International Technique d'Experts Juridique Aeiens
(CITEJA) created by the Paris Conference.122 By addressing the
"Liability of Carriers" to passengers and shippers,1 23 drafters sought to
"do for the law" within international civil aviation what the "engineers
[were] doing for machines."' 124 The Warsaw Convention did not replace
private law rules existing in member states, nor was it meant to be
applicable in all cases of international air transport.1 25 Rather, it was
designed to apply to international transportation when departure and
126
destination are within the territories of two different signatory nations.
If departure and destination are within the territory of a signatory, then it
is applicable only if there is an agreed stopping place outside of that
country, 27 although the stopping place does not have to be within a
signatory nation.1 28 The character of the transportation contracted for
said to form the basis of the test for
rather than the voyage itself was
129
Convention.
the
of
applicability
The purpose of Warsaw was, first, to establish a degree of
uniformity since aviation was going to link different legal systems and,
30
second, to limit the potential liability of carriers in case of accidents.
Toward the first end, Warsaw established uniformity in documentation
and procedures and substantive law applicable for dealing with claims

121. George W. Orr, The Warsaw Convention, 31 VA. L. REv. 423, 423-24 (1945); Andreas F.
Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L.
REv. 497,498 (1967).
122. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 121, at 498. The United States did not
participate in the work of CITEJA and it only sent an observer to the Conference. See id.at 502.
Nevertheless, in 1933 the Commerce Department advised the State Department that all United
States operators conducting international air transport services favored adherence, the State
Department then sent its approval to the President who submitted the Treaty to the Senate which,
without debate, committee hearing or report was approved by voice vote on June 15, 1934. See id
The instrument of adherence was deposited by the United States on July 3 1, 1934 and the President
proclaimed the Treaty ninety days later. See id (citing Warsaw Convention, supra note 3).
123. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, at arts. 17-18, 24; Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn,
supra note 12 1, at 499.
124. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 121, at 498 (citing author's translation of II
Conference International De Droit Prive Aerien, 4-12 Octobre 1929, Varsovie 17 (1930)).
125. See Sack, supra note 120, at 348.
126. See Warsaw Convention, supranote 3, art. 1(2).
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See Sack, supra note 120, at 350.
130. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 121, at 498-99.
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Toward the second,

Warsaw struck a bargain between carriers and passengers, shifting the
burden of
proof of negligence on to the carrier in return for a limit on
132
liability.
Uniformity was promoted by guaranteeing a cause of action to a
passenger in case of injury, a cause of action that might otherwise be
difficult to establish or entirely unavailable. 133 Uniformity was also

furthered by providing for the four places of jurisdiction in damage
accidents: where the carrier is domiciled, where it has its principle place
of business, where it has a place of business through which the contract
was made, and the place of destination. 34 The place of domicile of the
passenger was not included, although since the passenger typically buys
a round trip ticket at his domicile, Warsaw was still thought to be helpful
35
1

in most cases.
The place of accident was not included and this was argued as
being advantageous to passengers, protecting them from limits of
liability below the Warsaw limits, although the number of countries with
lower limits was never great. 13 6 Furthermore, this conclusion was based
on the assumption that the law applicable at the place of injury would
govern. 137 Although consistent with the classical rule for tort claims, the
doctrine had begun to be eroded in transportation accidents as early as
1935.138 Therefore, the benefit to passengers of defining the jurisdiction
was never fully realized since courts began looking to "the local law of
the state where the injury occurred [to] determine[] the ...liabilit[y] of
the parties, unless some other state has a more significant relationship
131. See id.
132. See id. at 500.
133. See id.
at 517. Although the creation by Warsaw of a right of action has been said to have
been assumed, in the United States at least, some courts assumed or decided that claims must be
founded on some law other than the Convention. See id.at 517-18 (citing Komlos v. Compagnie
Nationale Air France, 111 F. Supp. 393, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'don other grounds, 209 F.2d 436
(2d Cir. 1953) and Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677, 679 (2d Cir. 1957)). But the
Second Circuit subsequently reversed its holdings in order to be consistent with its view that
Warsaw is an "internationally binding body of uniform air law." Benjamins v. British European
Airways, 572 F.2d 914, 917, 917-19 (noting that most cases will fall under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and
treaty jurisdiction under § 1331 will only be necessary when plaintiffs and defendants are all aliens).
Since then, the Supreme Court has held that Warsaw provides the exclusive cause of action for
injuries sustained during international air transportation. See El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan
Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 160, 176 (1999).
134. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, at art. 28(1).
135. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 121, at 523.
136. See id.
at 526.
137. Seeid. at527.
138. Seeid. at 527-28.
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involved, in
with the occurrence and the parties as to the particular issue
13 9
which event the local law of the latter state will govern."
Realization of the second goal of the Convention gave carriers the
chief benefit of the bargain between passengers and carriers, with their
potential liability limited to approximately $8,300 dollars-a low
amount even in 1929.140 That the Convention rejected an "insurance"
rule of carrier liability for passenger injury perhaps was due in part to
the belief that passengers preferring air transportation "knowingly and
voluntarily assum[e] the flying hazard." 14 1 Be that as it may, the limit on
liability was designed to facilitate international air transportation
development by lessening litigation and providing a more secure basis
on which to obtain insurance.142 Without the "fear of a single
catastrophic accident"43it was hoped that airlines would be able to more
easily attract capital. 1
Passengers received the benefit of the carrier being presumed liable
unless it could show that it had taken all measures that could be taken or
that taking those measures was impossible, unless the carrier engaged in
willful misconduct. 144 But burden shifting already existed for air travel
in some countries and jurisdictions under doctrines such as res ipsa
loquitur.145 Thus, the ability to bring suit in one of four forums was the
primary benefit to passengers in exchange for the chief benefit of the
bargain to carriers of a cap on potential liability.
Most subsequent debate about Warsaw centered on the
appropriateness of the cap amount, with the personal injury and death
action awards in the United States and other developed countries
pointing to the need for a higher cap. 146 Even so, the amount was said to
be satisfactory to others and even too high for some, discouraging a
number of countries from adhering. 47 The limit on liability has been
139. See id.
at 531 (quoting a 1964 draft of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws). In
the United States, if Warsaw did not apply, the standard applied in "federal" choice-of-law analysis
and that of most states is the "significant-contacts test" of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of
Laws (1971), section 145 for personal injury and section 175 for wrongful death. Joel S. Perwin,
Damage Choice of Law, 2 ATLA Annual Convention Reference Materials, Aviation Law Section
(2001).
140. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 121, at 499.
141. Sack, supranote 120, at 362.
142. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 121, at 499-500.
143. Jd. at499.
144. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, at arts. 20, 25; Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra
note 121, at 500.
145. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 121, at 519.
146. See id at 504.
147. See id.
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increased numerous times since, through the use of various amending
protocols and agreements.' 48
By June 30, 1999, 147 states were party to the treaty. 149 But despite
various attempts to modernize the Warsaw system, and in view of "rapid
changes in the world's socio-economic conditions since the [treaty's
enactment], and the unsatisfactory situation that subsisted with regard to
liability limits of the air carrier," the treaty needed "socio-economic
analysis." 150 In 1997, the International Civil Aviation Organization
provide "a framework for a
("ICAO") initiated such an analysis to 151
modernized regime of air carrier liability.
3. The Montreal Modernization
The "modernization and consolidation of the Warsaw System,"
undertaken by a ICAO-appointed group, resulted in a Draft
Convention. 152 Thus conceived, a new treaty of private international air
law-the Montreal Convention-was born on May 28, 1999.'
"[D]esigned to meet the challenges of the advancement of international
air law at the dawn of the new millennium,"' 154 the Montreal Convention
replaces the six legal instruments comprising the Warsaw System. 55 The
ICAO study reported, first, that internationally-mandated limits on
liability encouraged claimants to use judicial proceedings to avoid them
and, second, that Warsaw limits were unacceptably low because of
in cost-of-living and other "socio-economic
world-wide variations
56
circumstances."1
Four methods to alleviate these problems were proposed and
ultimately incorporated in the Montreal Convention. First, carriers would
148.

See J.C. Batra, Modernization of the Warsaw System-Montreal 1999, 65 J. AIR L. &

COM. 429, 430-32 (2000). For a complete listing of subsequent amendments, see Allan 1.
Mendelsohn & Renee Lieux, The Warsaw Convention Article 28, the Doctrine of Forum Non
Conveniens, and the Foreign Plaintiff,68 J.AIR L. & COM. 75, 76 n.7 (2003).
149. See Batra, supra note 148, at 429.
150. Id. at433,
151.

Id.

152. Id.
153. See Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air
Done at Montreal, May 28 1999, S.TREATY DOc NO. 106-45 [hereinafter Montreal Convention];
Batra, supra note 148, at 433. There are sixty-two parties to the Montreal Convention. See INT'L
AIR

TRANSPORT

ASS'N,

THE

LIABILITY

REPORTER,

Feb.

2005,

at

http://wwwiata.org/NR/rdonlyres/2EE7CD58-1C6B-429F-9431 -EAFDDFAEAOAB/O/
2005LiabilityReporter.pdf (last visited Aug. 14, 2005).
154. Batra, supra note 148, at 433 (referring to the opening remarks of Dr. Assad Kotaite made
at the ICAO Legal Committee 30"' Session).
155. Id.at 441.
at433.
156. See id.
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be strictly liable for up to 100,000 Special Drawing Rights ("SDR"), an
IMF monetary unit. 157 Second, baggage and cargo liability would be
"per passenger" rather than by weight. Third, a mechanism for updating
liability limits would be included. Fourth, a "fifth jurisdiction," based on
for claims for damages
the passenger's domicile, would be added
158
injury.
or
death
passenger
from
resulting
The adopted system of liability was to be two-tiered. In addition to
strict liability for 100,000 SDR, full and unlimited compensation would
be allowed in cases of negligence or other "wrongful act on omission of
the carrier or its servants/agents."' 159 Nevertheless, carriers were to be
given protection in at least two ways. First, the carrier could be
exonerated, either wholly or in part, from liability for damages
contributed to or caused by the claimant. Second, carriers were given the
option of opting out of liability altogether by stipulating that "the
contract of carriages shall be subject to. . . no limits of liability
160

whatsoever.',

The Montreal modernization reflected a balancing of interests of
the international civil aviation industry, signatory states, and airline
passengers. 16 1 Just as with the Warsaw Convention, a primary benefit to
passengers under the rules of the Montreal Convention is passengerchoice among jurisdictions in which to bring claims. Indeed, the addition
of the fifth forum from which to choose, that of "the territory of a state
in which at the time of the accident the passenger has his or her principal
and permanent residence," being contrary to usual jurisdictional
procedural law in compensation cases,1 62 is an especially important
benefit received by passengers. 163 The aim of this addition has been said
157. See id. at435.
158. Seeid. at440.
159. Id.at 438.
160. Batra, supranote 148, at 440; Montreal Convention, supra note 153, at art. 20, 25.
161. Montreal Convention of 1999 on Compensationfor Accident Victims Set to Enter Into
Force, Sept. 5, 2003, available at http://www.icao.int/icao/en/nr/2003/pio2003l4.htm (last visited
July 23, 2005) (quoting the President of the Council of the ICAO, Dr. Assad Kotaite, as saying, "In
developing this new Montreal Convention, we were able to reach a delicate balance between the
needs and interests of all partners in international civil aviation, States, the traveling public, air
carriers and the transport industry").
162. See Batra supra note 148, at 440; Montreal Convention, supra note 153, at art. 33(1).
163. Unlike the other four jurisdictions concerning any passenger or cargo claim, the "fifth
jurisdiction" is available only for claims based on death or injury. Pablo Mendes DeLeon & Werner
Eyskens, The Montreal Convention: Analysis of Some Aspects of the Attempted Modernization and
Consolidation of the Warsaw System, 66 J. AIR L. & COM. 1155, 1161 (2001). Furthermore, the
passenger's principal and permanent residence at the time of the accident must be within a signatory
state (a "State") in order for the passenger to bring a claim there. Id. at 1162. That State must also be
one to or from which the carrier operates passenger carriage services, using its own aircraft or that
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to be "to allow highly mobile individuals, such as temporary expatriates,
to sue carriers in their home country., 164 And yet, the value of the
passenger choice of forum, part of both Montreal and the initial Warsaw
bargain between passengers and
carriers as well, is eroded when FNC is
165
applied to revoke that choice.
B.

The Plaintiff's Option-orNot?

In the United States, Article 28 of Warsaw provides treaty
jurisdiction for claims falling within its provision and federal jurisdiction
is established under the "arising under" clause of 28 U.S.C. § 133 1.166
Indeed courts have determined Article 28(1), designating the four
forums in which action must be brought, at the option of the plaintiff, to
be "jurisdictional in nature and the points of jurisdiction it specifies are
national in scope."' 167 Article 28(2) says that questions of procedure are
168
to be governed by the law of the court to which the case is submitted.
Therein lies the rub.
1. The Way We Were
Although the plaintiff has "the option" of bringing his complaint
under Warsaw to one of four designated forums, some have contended
of another carrier under a code-share agreement. The State must also be one in which the carrier
conducts such passenger carriage services from premises leased or owned by it or by another carrier
with which it has a commercial agreement (other than an agency agreement), and this carrier might
not be the same one as the code-sharing partner operating the said passenger carriage services. Id. at
1162-63. Although the interpretation of this provision leaves unanswered questions as to the exact
relationship between the carrier, any commercial partner, and the accident giving rise to a claim, see
id., a finding of U.S. jurisdiction under any interpretation would clearly meet minimum contacts
threshold requirements for the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant airline by a federal court.
164. See id. at 1164. Although proffered as a reason for the addition, in actuality, the number
of passengers for whom the home country would become available as a place to bring a claim only
because of this provision should be rather limited. See id.
165. See infra.
166. See Mendelsohn & Lieux, supra note 148, at 78-79.
167. Ochoa v. Avianca (In re Air Disaster Near Cove Neck, New York, on Jan. 25, 1990), 774
F. Supp. 725, 726 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
168. The official text of the Warsaw Convention is French and courts must interpret its
meaning in accordance with the legal meaning of the French text. See Eastern Airlines, Inc. v.
Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 536 (1991). The French version of Article 28 is:
(1) L'action en responsabilitd devra 8tre port~e, au choix du demandeur, dans le territoire
d'une des Hautes Parties Contractantes, soit devant le tribunal du domicile du
transporteur, du siege principal de son exploitation ou du lieu off il poss~de un
istablissement par le soin duquel le contract a 6td conclu, soit devant le tribunal du lieu
de destination.
(2) La procedure sera rrglde par la loi du tribunal saisi.
See Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, at art. 28.
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that this does not give the plaintiff an absolute right to decide which
court will hear the case. 169 In the United States, the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit appears to have been the first court to specifically
address the question, finding that the "option of Plaintiff' language did
not grant an absolute and inalterable right to choose the national forum
in which their claims would be litigated. 170 "We simply do not believe
that the United States through adherence to the Convention has meant to
forfeit such a valuable procedural tool as the doctrine of forum non
conveniens.' ' 17 1 "If we were to adopt the plaintiffs' construction of
article 28(1) and ignore the language of article 28(2), American courts
could become the 1forums
for litigation that has little or no relationship
72
with this country.'

Nine years later, another federal court, albeit a district one, agreed
with the Fifth Circuit and found that Warsaw did not preclude dismissal
underforum non conveniens.173 The Southern District of New York first
74
rejected the plaintiff's claim that United States v. Nat ' City Lines, Inc.'
stands for the proposition that FNC is not available when a statute or
treaty creates a right of action establishing special jurisdiction and
dictating venue. 75 The court read National City Lines more narrowly as
applying only to the Clayton Act's conferral of special jurisdiction in
certain antitrust actions and prohibition on transfer to other federal
district courts. 176 The court specifically rejected the
proposition that any
177
special venue statute will prohibit FNC dismissal.
The court also rejected the plaintiffs argument that the defendant
carrier was precluded from arguing that the plaintiff's chosen forum was
169. See Mendelsohn & Lieux, supranote 148, at 80-81.
170. Trivelloni-Lorenzi v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. (In re Air Crash Disaster Near New
Orleans, Louisiana on July 9, 1982), 821 F.2d 1147, 1168 (5th Cir. 1987), vacated and remandedon
other grounds, Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Lopez, 490 U.S. 1032 (1989). "Our research
indicates no such cases exist." Id. at 1161 n.22.
171. Id.at 1162.
172. Id.
173. In re Air Crash Off Long Island New York, on July 17, 1996, 65 F. Supp. 2d 207, 213-15
(S.D.N.Y. 1999). Aviation law commentators have said that it was generally assumed (at least
before Hosaka, to be discussed infra Part III.B.2) that FNC was available under Warsaw "as a
procedural tool to try to defeat the increasing resort to U.S. courts by foreigners in aviation crash
cases." Mendelsohn & Lieux, supra note 148, at 96 (citing Chukwu v. Air France, 218 F. Supp. 2d
979, 987-88 (N.D. I11.2002); see also In re Air Crash Disaster of Aviateca Flight 901 Near San
Salvador, El Salvador on Aug. 9, 1995, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1353 (S.D. Fla. 1997); In re Disaster at
Riyadh Airport, Saudi Arabia, on Aug. 19,1980, 540 F. Supp. 1141,1154 (D.D.C. 1982).
174. 334 U.S. 573 (1948).
175. In reAir Crash Off Long Island New York, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 213.
176. Seeidat213.
177. See id.
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inconvenient, contending that the drafting history of Warsaw
demonstrates that the four forums in Article 28 were chosen for their
convenience to the carrier.1 78 The plaintiffs had pointed to the rejection
of the place of accident as a forum to prevent suit in a country with
"undeveloped law, no relation to the contract, or far from the carrier's
home."' 179 The plaintiffs had also relied on Great Britain's submitted, but
withdrawn, proposal to allow judicial discretion to decline jurisdiction as
evidence that FNC should not be permitted. The court rejected these
drafting history arguments, deeming the history inconclusive as to the
intent of the drafters with regard to the purpose and meaning of Article
28. 180
Instead, the court read the treaty as literally allowing "[q]uestions
of procedure [to] be governed by the law of the court to which the case
is submitted., 181 Concluding that FNC is "a procedural tool available to
U.S. courts and thus squarely falls within the literal language of Article
28(2), ' ' 182 the court did not discuss whether or not FNC would have been
considered a "procedure" at that time by the drafters.
While the Long Island court affirmed the applicability of the FNC
doctrine in Warsaw cases, some commentators considered the Southern
District to have "laid the groundwork for effectively precluding forum
non conveniens dismissals even when the plaintiffs are all foreign
nationals," because of the way it applied and weighed the Gilbert
factors.1 83 These commentators expressed concern specifically about the
court's having considered the lack of contingency fee arrangements in
the alternative forum, France, and the investment in the case thus far by
the plaintiffs U.S. attorneys in discovery, investigation, experts,
consultants, and pretrial proceedings. 184 These commentators predicted
that when the foreign country to which FNC dismissal is sought does not
allow contingency fee arrangements, the door would "close ...on all
' 85
future FNC transfers abroad from New York's Southern District."
These commentators would instead have plaintiffs returned to their
home forums for "fair and accurate calculation[s] of death and injury
178. Seeid. at214.
179. Id. at 214 (citing MINUTES, SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE
AERONAUTICAL LAW, OCT. 4-12, 1929, WARSAW, 113-16 (Robert C. Homer & Didier Legrez
trans., 1975)).
180. Id.
181. Id.

182. Id.
183. See Mendelsohn & Lieux, supra note 148, at 96.
184. Id.at 101-02.
185. Id
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damages" because of "acknowledged difficulties involved in
determining foreign compensation laws and practices. 18 6 Although the
authors had earlier criticized the court in Long Island for including a
comparison of law as between the United States and France in its FNC
analysis, 18 7 here they criticized the court for not specifically addressing
the availability of compulsory process for unwilling witnesses although
such an analysis would also have involved "exercises in comparative
law." 18 8 These complaints about the Long Island court's analysis help
demonstrate the instrumentalist nature of the FNC doctrine. Arguments
about the "difficulties" and "complex exercises" of courts, and
foreign plaintiffs choos[ing] U.S. courts not because of any direct
connection between this country and the accident, but rather because of
the advantages of contingency fee arrangements readily available in
U.S. practice, or because they hope to benefit by the higher and more
generous recoveries that are usually available in U.S. courts and from
U.S. juries[,]' 89
reflect concerns about the practical effects on courts of having to hear
such cases coupled with what appears to be a bias against foreign
plaintiffs. While these arguments are no doubt seductive to busy jurists,
they may be entirely unrelated to the objects and purposes underlying
the compromises reached in international agreements granting
jurisdiction.
2. Hosaka v. United Airlines
In Hosaka v. UnitedAirlines, Inc., 90 the Ninth Circuit, when asked
to hear the consolidated appeals of plaintiffs whose death and injury
actions were dismissed by the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California on the ground of forum non conveniens,
became the first circuit court since the Fifth Circuit in New Orleans to
address directly the issue of FNC use in Warsaw Convention cases. 19 1
Hosaka involved Japanese passengers en route from Japan to Hawaii on
December 29, 1997 on a United Airlines flight. Three hours into the
flight and 1,000 miles from Japan in international airspace over the

186.
187.
evidence
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id.at 106.
Id. at 99 (concluding that because of the way in which France calculates damages,
existing only within the U.S. would be needed).
Id. at 99-100 (quoting the Court in Piper,454 U.S. at 251).
ld.at lo.
305 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2002).
Id.at 993.
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Pacific Ocean, the plane encountered severe turbulence.'9 2 Plaintiffs,
including Mrs. Hosaka, claimed physical and emotional harm, including
fractured ribs, broken necks and permanent spinal damage as a result of
"catapulted against the cabin and/or fellow
passengers 1being
93
passengers."'

The District Court had granted United's motions to dismiss for
FNC, holding that Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention grants the
plaintiff the option of choosing among four jurisdictions, but that it does
not preclude a court's entertaining an FNC motion. 94 Plaintiffs
appealed, arguing that any application of FNC was contrary to the plain
meaning of Warsaw, and thus an unauthorized qualification of the
treaty. 195 The Ninth Circuit, for its part, found the text of Warsaw to be
ambiguous, rather than plain. Nevertheless, the court deemed the
purposes, the drafting history of the treaty, and the evidence of the
parties' understanding and treatment of FNC in other treaties and courts
post-ratification as not supporting the contention that the contracting
parties intended to permit "the plaintiffs choice of national forum to be
negated" by the use of FNC.196 Finding FNC inapplicable in Warsaw
in another country, the court
cases where the alternative forum is
97
reversed the district court's dismissal. 1
a.

The Text-Ambiguous

In finding the treaty ambiguous, the court cited what it labeled "two
equally plausible interpretations," that of the court in Long Island and
the British Court of Appeal in Milor S.R.L. v. British Airways PLC.198 In
Milor, the court concluded that the text precluded the use of FNC
dismissals, reasoning that the scope of a State's use of its procedural law
under Article 28(2) is limited by the jurisdictional grant of Article 28(1),
granting to the plaintiff the absolute right to choose between the four
99

forums. 1

see also Appellants' Opening Brief with Addendum at 6, Hosaka v. United Airlines,
192. Id.;
Inc., 305 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2002) (No. 00-15223), available at 2001 WL 30495322.
193. Appellants' Brief at 6, Hosaka (No. 00-15223). Mr. Hosaka died from his injuries. Id.
194. 305 F. 3d at 993.
195. Appellants' Brief at 7-8, Hosaka (No. 00-15223).
196. 305 F 3d at 1003-04.
197. Id.at1004.
198. In re Air Crash Off Long Island New York, 65 F. Supp. 2d 207; Milor S.R.L. v. British
Airways PLC, [1996] Q.B. 702 (Eng. C.A.).
199. Id.; see also 305 F.3d at 994-95, 995 n.5 (citing Milor, [1996] Q.B. 702, noting it to be
"entitled to considerable weight" under Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 404 (1985), as the opinion
of a "sister signator[y]").
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Had the court adopted the Milor court's textual analysis,
interpreting the use of portee in the official French version of Article
28(1) as requiring that actions be litigated to conclusion in the plaintiffs
selected forum, 200 it might have concluded that the text was not
ambiguous. Whereas the Milor court had construed the use of the word
"intentee," in Article 29 governing the timeliness of the lawsuit and
interpreted as meaning that an action must be "brought" within two
years, as requiring the treaty interpretation that the use of the two
different words reflected an intent to have them mean something
different,20 ' the Hosaka court looked outside the text of the treaty to
understand the meaning.
The Hosaka court looked to the Montreal Convention's use of the
word portee in Article 33(1), designed to replace Article 28(1) of
Warsaw, wherein "[a]n action for damages must be brought, at the
option of the plaintiff., 20 2 In Article 33(2), the French text employs
intentee rather than portee in stating what the English version states as
"[i]n respect of damage resulting from the death or injury of a passenger,
an action may be brought before one of the courts mentioned in
paragraph 1 of this Article, or in the territory.
,203 Because it found
that the Montreal Convention's usage suggested that any difference in
the meanings of the two words was not dispositive, the court found the
text of Article 28 to be ambiguous. 0 4
b.

The Purpose-To Achieve Uniformity and Balance
Interests

Having found the treaty ambiguous, the court then looked to the
purposes of the treaty to aid in interpretation.20 5 The court first agreed
with the Milor court that one of the purposes was to "harmonise different
national views on jurisdiction" by "creat[ing] a self-contained code on
jurisdiction. 20 6 The court identified the second purpose of the
Convention to be to balance the interests of carriers against those of
passengers. 22007 The court concluded that permitting defendants to utilize

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
(1998)).

305 F.3d at 995.
Milor, [1996] Q.B. at 702; see also 305 F.3d at 995.
305 F.3d at 994.
305 F.3d at 1000 (quoting Montreal Convention, supra note 153, at art. 33(2)).
See 305 F.3d at 996.
See id.
Id.at 996 (quoting Milor, [1996] Q.B. at 707).
See id.at 997 (citing El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 170
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FNC to void the plaintiffs choice of forum would undermine both
objects-uniformity and balance.20 8
c. The Drafting History-No Minority Rule
The court reviewed the drafting history, specifically the attempt on
the part of the British delegation to amend the Convention to expressly
preserve a court's discretionary power to decline jurisdiction when
permitted under the procedural rules of the forum state. 20 9 The following
paragraph would have been added to now Article 28:
None of the stipulations of this Article shall be deemed to bind any
court whatsoever to hear a complaint which it would consider,
according to the principles of law and procedure in force in the country
to which the said court belongs,210as contrary to the rules of justice, or as
irrelevant to be submitted to it.
In the end, the amendment was not included. 2 11 The Hosaka court
considered the failed proposal relevant as "strongly suggest[ing] that the
contracting parties were cognizant of the doctrine and did not understand
Article 28(2) as silently incorporating, or acquiescing in, its
application." 2 12 Concluding that it would be unreasonable to infer that
"continental jurists" would have "succumbed to the British, common law
point of view," the court inferred instead that if the delegates had
intended to permit FNC application, they would have explicitly so
provided.213
d. Postratification Understanding-If They Mean It, They
Must Say It
i. The Drafting of the Montreal Convention
The Hosaka plaintiffs had contended that the more recent drafting
history of the Montreal Convention supports the view that the language
of Article 28(2) does not permit FNC.214 Specifically, delegates from

208. See id. at 997.
209. See id.
210. Id. (quoting from the MINUTES OF THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
PRIVATE AERONAUTICAL LAW, supra note 179, at 298-99).
211. Id. at 998.

212. Id.
213.
214.

Id.at 999.
Seeid. at 999-1000.
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civil law jurisdictions made considerable objection to attempts by
common law state delegates to introduce language permitting FNC
application. z 5 In fact, the United States offered an amendment to Article
33(4) to explicitly include FNC and "similar doctrines" as procedures
governed by the law of the Court seised of the case.2 l6 In the end, the
civil law jurisdiction delegates prevailed, and the final version of the
Montreal Convention did not include the FNC provision.21 7
Nevertheless, the Hosaka court did not find the drafting history to
have conclusively established that the U.S. proposal would have been a
change to the Warsaw system. What it did find was that the drafting
history suggested a lack of shared understanding as to whether the
Warsaw Convention language, "standing alone, permits or precludes
application of forum non conveniens. ' ' 18 Whereas the U.S. delegate had
opined that FNC would apply in the U.S. whether prescribed by treaty or
not, the British delegate considered the plaintiff to be entitled to an
"absolute choice among four forums, a choice... not [to] be
undermined by forum non conveniens. 219
ii.

Other Multi-National Treaties

The court reviewed the history of other international agreements,
concluding that the Warsaw Convention's silence on FNC precludes its
application. First, the court noted that the Brussels Convention,
governing enforcement of judgments among European Union countries,
contains no explicit FNC doctrine and has been construed as barring its
application. 2 0 Second, the court cited the failure of the efforts of the
United Kingdom and Ireland to negotiate the introduction of FNC into
the European Economic Community in conjunction with their joining in
1979.221 The court recognized that when the intent of a multilateral
treaty has been to allow the doctrine, it has explicitly so said, referencing
the negotiating history of the Hague Conference on Private International
Law. 222 Participants to the Hague Conference were said to have
215.

See id. at 1000.

216. Id
217.

Id.

218. Id.at 1001.
219. Id.
220. See id. at 1001 (citing Alan Reed, To Be or Not to Be: The Forum Non Conveniens
Performance Acted Out on Anglo-American Courtroom Stages, 29 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 31,

106-07 (2000)).
221. Id. at 1001 (citing Stuckelberg, supra note 71, at 963).
222. See id. at 1001 (citing Fritz Blumer, Jurisdictionand Recognition in TransatlanticPatent
Litigation,9 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 329, 392-93 (2001)).
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"vigorously debated the availability of forum non conveniens," a debate
that ultimately led to the explicit adoption of a version of the doctrine
balancing common law and civil law interests.2 23 And, finally, the court
cited the Supreme Court in Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd,224 as
reasoning that the absence of any explicit reference to "mental injury" in
demonstrated a lack of intent on the part
the Warsaw Convention itself225
of the signatories to include it.
iii. Other U.S. Courts
The Hosaka court found the Fifth Circuit to be the only other circuit
court to have addressed the issue of FNC dismissal of Warsaw
Convention cases.226 The Hosaka court disagreed, however, with the
Fifth Circuit's conclusion that the U.S. would not have forfeited FNC 7
Conceding that the doctrine might today be characterized as "a valuable
procedural tool," the Hosaka court did not find it to have necessarily
been so in 1929.228

IV. HOSAKA:

EXEMPLARY OF A "GOOD FAITH" APPROACH TO

RESOLVING A TREATY AMBIGUITY

Flight, of its nature, has been the creator of new difficulties in both
public and private international law. It is something so inherently and
pre-eminently international itself that it was bound to have this effect.
But it is at the same time something so romantic and almost unreal that
development as involving the
one finds it hard to conceive its 229
development also of law and litigation.
The rich interpretative approach to treaty interpretation undertaken
by the Ninth Circuit is protective of U.S. and international interests in
assuring needed uniformity in multi-lateral treaties that rely on judicial
implementation. Its thoroughness makes its finding of FNC

223.

Id

224.
225.

499 U.S. 530 (1991).
305 F.3d at 1002 (citing Floyd, 499 U.S. at 545).

226. Id at 1001 (citing Trivelloni-Lorenzi v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. (In re Air Crash
Disaster Near New Orleans, Louisiana on July 9, 1982), 821 F.2d 1147, 1161-62 (5th Cir. 1987),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Lopez, 490 U.S. 1032
(1989)).
227. See id. at 1002.
228. See id.
229.

SPAIGHT, supranote 1, at 106.
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more persuasive than the contrary holding of the Fifth
inapplicability
230
Circuit.
What can be done when a textual reading of a treaty reveals an
ambiguity? Where the ambiguity lies only in the inherent limitations of
language, and resolution of the ambiguity lies merely in ascertaining
which textual interpretation comports with the original understanding of
the parties, reference to travauxpreparatoiresand subsequent actions of
the parties may uncover the understanding. But what can a court do
when that analysis leaves considerable uncertainty as to the
understanding? By identifying and applying the interpretation more
likely to give effect to the underlying object and purpose of the treaty, a
court may uphold its nation's obligation to perform the treaty in good
faith.
The Hosaka court's analysis best upholds the good faith obligation
of the United States as a signatory to Warsaw. Furthermore, the
considered approach to treaty interpretation undertaken by the Hosaka
court protects U.S. interests in assuring the ongoing vitality of
international bargains because such an approach is more likely to result
in an interpretation acceptable to sister signatories. The Hosaka court
had the benefit of Milor, a decision of a sister signatory, which
demonstrated the ambiguity contained within the Warsaw text. The
Milor court's view that the "procedural power" of FNC is "inconsistent
with the right conferred on the plaintiff to choose ' 231 was in contrast to
the textual interpretation previously adopted by the Long Island court
that Article 28(2) "plainly incorporates the forum state's procedural
law."232 Since the ambiguity was made apparent by these conflicting
interpretations, the Hosaka court rightly engaged in a fuller analysis,
appropriate under the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence.
The intent of the original parties to the Warsaw agreement as to the
use of FNC may never be known. Perhaps the parties reached no
agreement on the matter, leaving no understanding for courts to
ascertain. But given the object and purpose of the treaty, the Hosaka
court's interpretation is a reasonable one. It is one that is also most likely
to garner the support of fellow signatories to the Warsaw Convention,
230. The Hosaka court noted that "[t]he persuasiveness of the Fifth Circuit's decision is limited
in several respects. The decision did not consider the purposes, drafting history and postratification
understanding of the parties." 305 F.3d at 1002. For a contrary position, see Alyson R. Martin,
Comment, The Warsaw Convention and Forum Non Conveniens: Should Federal Courts Be
Allowed to Apply the Doctrine in Damages Actions Brought Under the Treaty?, I U. ST. THOMAS
L.J. 750, 772 (2003).
231. Milor S.R.L. v. British Airways PLC, [1996] Q.B. 702,706 (Eng. C.A.).
232. 305 F.3d at 995.
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the majority of whom are civil law countries. As such, they do not have
FNC doctrines so their courts lack discretion to decline to hear cases
properly brought under Warsaw. Some countries have moved to enact
statutory provisions to prevent U.S. courts from dismissing cases under
FNC by making their courts unavailable to their citizens who first sue in
the court of another country. 233 These actions prevent FNC dismissals in
individual cases by removing adequate "alternative forums," and
demonstrate international discontent with U.S. FNC use.234 Because
FNC is unavailable to most signatories and countries are acting to
prevent its use by the U.S., the Hosaka court's interpretation supports
U.S. interests in international cooperation.
That the Ninth Circuit was willing to concede a discretionary power
otherwise available to it is truly remarkable and may speak to the
soundness of the Hosaka decision. The court avoided the
"methodological provincialism" of applying a home-centered analysis.
Indeed, the court's consideration of discussions related to FNC
provisions in other international agreements, including Montreal,
evinced a willingness to identify and promote ongoing international
consensus. The court's approach is the kind that may help foster ongoing
collaborative processes conducive to upholding international
agreements.
As noted in supra Part II.A., the principle of treaty law that a
country must comply in good faith to the treaties to which it is a party is
so fundamental that a country may not invoke a violation of its own law
to avoid compliance. The need for uniformity in treaty implementation
necessitates their being preemptive of contra state substantive law,
unless the particular internal rule is of fundamental importance. FNC is
used to dismiss cases that are more appropriately brought elsewhere.
Indeed, the doctrine is inapplicable to cases that are improperly before
233. See Mendelsohn, supra note 6, 47-48. Such laws exist in Ecuador, Panama, Costa Rica,
Guatemala, and the Philippines. Id. at 48.
234. This sort of "negative conflicts of jurisdiction" must be avoided for an international
system of "dispute resolution" to be effective. Andrew L. Strauss, Beyond National Law: The
Neglected Role of the InternationalLaw of Personal Jurisdiction in Domestic Courts, 36 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 373, 421 (1995).

[D]octrine-makers are confused in believing that [S]tates can self-prescribe their
jurisdiction. In fact, it is precisely because jurisdiction is intrinsically international that
the paradigm requires it to be prescribed by the international order, and that domestic
courts should apply such international law as authoritative in cases involving foreign
plaintiffs or defendants. There is no reason why this should be any less the case when it
comes to jurisdiction than when it comes to any other area of law appropriately
prescribed by the international order.
Id. at 407.
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the court. Improperly brought cases are dismissed for lack of subject
matter or personal jurisdiction. FNC is applicable only when the court
has the case, but decides that another court would be more appropriate.
Thus, FNC is clearly not of such fundamental importance as to preempt
U.S. interests in international cooperation.
Although it is difficult to imagine a federal court voluntarily ceding
a discretionary power when another "reading" of a treaty's intent could
rather easily have been justified, the Ninth Circuit's willingness to do
just that may reflect an assessment of FNC's true importance similar to
the one implied by the Supreme Court in American Dredging
Company.235 The Court opined that the doctrine of FNC is "nothing
more or less than a supervening venue provision, permitting
displacement of the ordinary rules of venue when, in light of certain
conditions, the trial court thinks that jurisdiction ought to be
declined., 236 The Court dismissed the importance of providing for FNC
motions in admiralty cases in part because "maritime actors [do not rely
on it] in making decisions about primary conduct-how to manage their
business and what precautions to take. 237 The court implied that the
primary benefit of the doctrine is to allow a state to avoid "burden[ing]
its judiciary with litigation better handled elsewhere., 238 Importantly, the
Court noted that uniformity and predictability of outcome are almost
impossible given the discretionary nature of FNC, "combined with the
multifariousness of the factors relevant to its application. 239 If the
Supreme Court does not consider FNC important enough to warrant a
federal pre-emption of state law proscribing its use in maritime law, it is
difficult to imagine that the Court would find the discretionary doctrine
important enough to warrant allowing it to disrupt uniformity in the
implementation of an international agreement in which jurisdiction is
prescribed. The Milor court was also skeptical of the overriding
importance of FNC.24 °
Where, as so often, substantial costs are incurred in interlocutory
battles in relation to jurisdiction, I have a suspicion that the object of
the exercise is frequently not to ensure that the trial takes place in the

235. Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443 (1994).
236. Id. at 453.
237. Id. at 454.
238. Id. ("Federal courts will continue to invoke forum non conveniens to decline jurisdiction
in appropriate cases, whether or not the State in which they sit chooses to burden its judiciary with
litigation better handled elsewhere.")
239. Id. at 455.
240. Milor S.R.L. v. British Airways PLC, [1996] Q.B. 702 (Eng. C.A.).
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appropriate forum, but to achieve a better negotiating stance in an
action which neither side expects to go to trial. There is something to
be said for a regime which restricts the choice of forum in a manner
which excludes those which are likely to be inappropriate, but which
41
does not otherwise permit the plaintiff's choice to be challenged.2
V.

CONCLUSION

Whether or not FNC will be available under Montreal remains to be
answered.242 An expectation that the use of the discretionary doctrine to
dismiss claims for damages resulting from the deaths and injuries of air
passengers will continue under a Montreal system is reflected in the

statement of one commentator:
[The addition of a fifth forum] may prove a gold mine for the lawyers
rather than for the claimants, because a court that is the least concerned
with the cause of action, or even where no evidence, witness, or record
relating the passenger's transportation, accidental injury, or death etc.,
is available in that forum, may ultimately2 43decline to entertain the
clauses [sic] as forum non-convenience [sic].
Yet, when a plaintiff chooses a court in compliance with the

jurisdictional provisions of Warsaw or Montreal

or, any other

international treaty with jurisdictional provisions for that matter, the
court so chosen is necessarily one "concerned.",244 The "concern" is that
241. Id.
242. Prof. Mendelsohn has argued that, whether or not Hosaka was correctly decided, the
"legislative history leading to the adoption of Article 33 of Montreal-99 clearly and categorically
demonstrates the intention and expectation of the U.S. government that U.S. courts would apply the
forum non conveniens doctrine under Article 33(4)-which in relevant respects is the identical
counterpart of Warsaw's Article 28(2)." Mendelsohn, supra note 6, at 46. Indeed, Prof. Mendelsohn
says that any plaintiff "bringing ... suit in the United States knows or should know ... [or at least]
assumes the risk[,] that the U.S. court may apply FNC and dismiss or 'transfer' the case back to the
courts of the victim's domicile or permanent residence." Id. at 48. Prof. Mendelsohn also notes that
much of the opposition to the use of the FNC doctrine voiced at the Montreal conference was from
the French delegation. Id. at 46 n.20. The Hosaka court "offer[ed] no opinion as to whether the text
and drafting history of the Montreal Convention demonstrate whether forum non conveniens would
be available." Hosaka v. United Airlines, Inc., 305 F.3d 989, 1001 (concluding that, despite
considerable discussion of FNC at Montreal, no "coherent picture of the parties' understanding" of
the availability of the doctrine under Warsaw emerged).
243. Batra, supra note 148, at 440.
244. One commentator has noted that plaintiffs' arguments that substantial local interest exists
in cases involving air crashes is "more palatable" to courts in part because the U.S. is "part of a
global economy and its citizens travel by air all over the world. The fact that an accident happens in
a foreign location is merely a fortuity, as is the citizenship of those on board the aircraft." Stuart R.
Fraenkel, Preparingfor and Presenting Opposition to Forum Non Conveniens Motions, 2 ATLA
Annual Convention Reference Materials, Aviation Law Section (2001).
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of its state, a state that expressed its concern by adhering to the treaty
that granted jurisdiction to its courts for just such cases under just such
circumstances. FNC use by federal courts is neither statutorily nor
constitutionally mandated.245 Therefore, one might argue that where
federal jurisdiction is based on the jurisdictional grant of an international
treaty to which the U.S. has adhered, the court may not entertain a
motion for dismissal under the FNC doctrine unless the signatories to the
treaty granting jurisdiction have clearly, and textually, manifested their
agreement that the doctrine be available. It is highly unlikely, however,
court will be easily convinced to relinquish its
that any U.S. federal
246
discretionary power.

When asked to address the issue, a court could decide that the text
of Montreal is not ambiguous and that matters of procedure are to be
decided by the courts to which cases are brought. Given the lack of
agreement that now exists under Warsaw, however, such a simplistic,
textualist reading is unlikely to be given by other than by the most
"nationalist" of courts. The ambiguity that exists in Montreal is now
decidedly apparent given the similarity to Warsaw of the relevant
provisions. Instead, it is more likely that any court asked to consider the
matter will identify the ambiguity early and proceed with a fuller
interpretation.
Proponents of the use of the doctrine will need to prove more than
just that signatories entered into the agreement cognizant of FNC's
healthy existence. Proponents must be prepared to convincingly
demonstrate that, in drafting the agreement, signatories shared an
expectation that the doctrine would be used under the new Montreal
regime. If the court determines that such a shared expectation did not
exist, then it should carefully consider whether or not FNC use is
consistent with the purpose and object of Montreal. Finally, in order to
nurture the long-term vitality of the agreement, the court should ask
whether allowing the use of FNC is likely to garner a "moving
consensus" among signatories.
The outcome of this controversy may turn on which court is asked
to address the issue first. If a court of a sister common-law signatory
finds the doctrine to be inapplicable under Montreal, then considerable
weight to that opinion can be expected to be given by U.S. courts,
especially if the foreign court is the highest one of that country, given
Supreme Court precedent. On the other hand, if a U.S. court hears the
245. See McFadden, supra note 15, at 265.
246. Id at 260.
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matter first, then the U.S. court will essentially be deciding the matter as
one of international first-impression. Of course, the courts of civil law
countries will be unable to speak as to their interpretations of the treaty
on this point because they do not entertain FNC motions.
[M]an's increasing mastery of the airways is creating day by day such
stuff as laws as well as dreams are made of. It will assuredly add new
the heads of our
chapters to the legal text-books, to puzzle
27
law.
study
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fate
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supra note 1, at 106.
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